Slaughter imminent?

[D2D]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command appears to be forming reserves capable of sustaining ongoing offensive operations in Ukraine, but these reserves are unlikely to be able to function as cohesive large-scale penetration or exploitation formations this year.
  
• Russian offensive tactics will likely increasingly pressure Ukrainian defenses as long as delays in Western security assistance persist.
  
• Russian forces conducted a larger series of missile strikes targeting Kyiv City on the night of March 20 to 21.
  
• NATO Military Committee Chairperson Admiral Rob Bauer stated that neither Ukraine nor NATO prompted Russia to invade Ukraine and that Ukrainian forces’ adaptations and innovations have in part changed modern warfare.
  
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on March 21 that Vice Admiral Konstantin Kabantsov became acting Commander of the Russian Northern Fleet.
  
• Bloomberg reported on March 20 that an unspecified source close to the Kremlin stated that the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian incursions into Belgorod Oblast are forcing the Russian military to divert forces from the frontline to Belgorod Oblast, although ISW has not observed such claims.
  
• US sanctions continue to influence the financial sector in post-Soviet countries, as two banks in Kazakhstan recently banned the use of Russia’s “Mir” national payment system to prevent secondary sanctions.
  
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on March 21.
  
• Russian officials continue to highlight the work of Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) in supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2024

[Truman62]

[D2D]

[D2D]

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/vg53E_72QI4" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/vg53E_72QI4</a>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vg53E_72QI4

Gun ban fails!

[D2D]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted the largest series of combined drone and missile strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the full-scale invasion during the night of March 21-22.
  
• Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities may aim to degrade Ukrainian defense industrial capacity, and Russian forces are likely trying to exploit Ukrainian air defense missile shortages in a renewed attempt to collapse Ukraine’s energy grid.
  
• Russian forces will likely continue offensive operations through Spring 2024 while preparing for an expected offensive effort in Summer 2024, although Russian forces will likely struggle to launch a concerted large-scale offensive operation in multiple operational directions in Ukraine at the same time.
  
• Russian forces likely seek to exploit current Ukrainian materiel shortages while preparing for efforts that will force Ukraine to expend a sizeable portion of the Western security assistance it may receive in the coming months.
  
• The Ukrainian military command appears to be prioritizing rotations for frontline units but will have to address additional manpower challenges if Ukrainian forces are to seize the initiative even on a localized basis in 2024 as Ukrainian senior military officers say they hope to do.
  
• Russian authorities reportedly intend to significantly expand crypto-mobilization efforts starting in Spring 2024 amid reports about significant decreases in the number of voluntary recruits.
  
• Verstka reported that select Russian officials stated that the Russian military command hopes that increased force generation will allow Russian forces to conduct a future offensive operation to encircle Kharkiv City. Such an operation would pose significant challenges both to the Russian forces responsible for the effort and to the wider Russian campaign in Ukraine, however.
  
• This Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for a mass shooting and bombing at a concert venue in the suburbs of Moscow on the evening of March 22.
  
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna, Avdiivka, Donetsk City, and the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact.
  
• Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 22 that Ukrainian authorities helped return another nine Ukrainian children to Ukrainian-controlled territory from occupied Ukraine and Russia.
  
• The Moscow military registration and enlistment office has reportedly begun to issue electronic summonses for the Spring 2024 Russian conscription cycle.

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22-2024

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/8NenhHlAba8" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/8NenhHlAba8</a>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8NenhHlAba8

Key Takeaways:

• Russian authorities claimed to have arrested the four attackers and seven others involved in the March 22 “Crocus City Hall” concert venue attack, which Russian authorities reported killed at least 133 civilians.
  
• ISW assesses that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the Crocus City Hall attack.
  
• The Kremlin nevertheless and without evidence quickly attempted to tie Ukrainian actors to the Crocus City Hall attack but has yet to formally accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack.
  
• Russian ultranationalists responded to the attack by reiterating typically xenophobic calls for anti-migrant policies, reflecting the growing tension in Russian society over the mistreatment of migrants and the impacts migrant disenfranchisement could have on expanding a viable recruitment base in Russia for Salafi-Jihadi groups.
  
• Russian sources accused Ukrainian actors of reportedly conducting a successful drone strike against a Russian oil refinery in Samara Oblast on the night of March 22 to 23.
  
• Russia is reportedly delaying the delivery of two S-400 air defense systems to India, likely due to limitations in Russia’s production of S-400 systems, an increased need for air defense systems to protect cities and strategic enterprises in Russia from Ukrainian drone strikes, and a reported souring of Russian relations with India.
  
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and Donetsk City and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
  
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on March 23 that will release individuals from criminal liability if they are called up for mobilization or sign military service contracts.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/9WQldsuG06w" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/9WQldsuG06w</a>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WQldsuG06w

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/_WVXtMdpneM" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/_WVXtMdpneM</a>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_WVXtMdpneM

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/M6weej8Rwtc" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/M6weej8Rwtc</a>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M6weej8Rwtc


Key Takeaways:

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said that the Crocus City Hall attackers originally fled toward Belarus not Ukraine, directly undermining the Kremlin narrative on Ukraine’s involvement, possibly to head off questions about why the attackers headed toward Belarus in the first place.
  
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Kremlin officials appear to be struggling to maintain a consistent rhetorical line about the Crocus City Hall attack, indicating that the Kremlin has not fully figured out how to reconcile its information operations with the reality of its intelligence and law enforcement failure.
  
• Russian officials are proposing actionable but likely impractical solutions to the emotional outcries for retribution in response to the Crocus City Hall attack.
  
• The Moldovan Constitutional Court reversed a ruling banning the Kremlin-affiliated Shor Party on March 26, which will likely allow pro-Russian Moldovan actors to reconsolidate around the Shor Party and reverse the impacts of the previous Moldovan ban on the party.
  
• Ukrainian officials stated on March 26 that Ukrainian forces successfully conducted a strike on the night of March 23 to 24 against a Ukrainian ship that Russian forces had captured in 2014.
  
• Separate investigations conducted by Western media outlets have found that Russian forces may be using Starlink terminals in Ukraine.
  
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Kreminna and Bakhmut on March 26.
  
• The Russian military has reportedly started recruiting personnel for elements of the newly reformed Leningrad Military District (LMD).

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2024

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/bHcrPhQpbas" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/bHcrPhQpbas</a>

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bHcrPhQpbas

Key Takeaways:

• The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
  
• Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
  
• Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.
  
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27.
  
• Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to posture efficacy in its force generation and social benefit allocation system

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-27-2024

[D2D]

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/v/i3DGm1dXtR8" target="_blank">https://www.youtube.com/v/i3DGm1dXtR8</a>


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i3DGm1dXtR8

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine is currently preventing Russian forces from making significant tactical gains along the entire frontline, but continued delays in US security assistance will likely expand the threat of Russian operational success, including in non-linear and possibly exponential ways.
  
• The continued degradation of Ukraine’s air defense umbrella provides one of the most immediate avenues through which Russian forces could generate non-linear operational impacts.
  
• Russia’s ability to conduct opportunistic but limited offensive actions along Ukraine’s international border with Russia offers Russia further opportunities to constrain Ukrainian manpower and materiel, but Western aid provisions and Ukrainian efforts to address manpower challenges would ease the impacts of such Russian efforts.
  
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to make sensationalized statements as part of Russia’s ongoing reflexive control campaign, which aims to deter further Western military aid provisions to Ukraine and deflect attention from the growing Russian force posturing against NATO.
  
• Putin’s March 27 statements are neither new nor surprising, and best illustrate how the Kremlin routinely overwhelms the Western information space, often with irrelevant or decontextualized truths rather than with outright misinformation or disinformation, to shape global perceptions and advance its own long-term objectives.
  
• The Russian Investigative Committee unsurprisingly claimed that it has evidence tying Ukraine to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack amid continued Kremlin efforts to link Ukraine and the West to the terrorist attack to generate more domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
  
• Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern for heightened ethnic tension in Russian society following the Crocus City Hall attacks and may be falsely blaming Ukraine and the West for the Crocus City Hall attack in order to divert domestic attention away from ethnic tensions.
  
• Ukrainian drone strikes against oil refineries in Russia are reportedly forcing Russia to import gasoline from Belarus.
  
• An independent investigation found that international information operation campaigns linked to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin remained active, despite the Russian government shutting down media companies and organizations overtly linked to Prigozhin after his death.
  
• Senior Russian officials are intensifying their victim-blaming of Armenian leadership as Armenia continues to distance itself from security relations with Russia after the Kremlin abandoned Armenia to its fate as it lost Nagorno-Karabakh.
  
• Russian forces made confirmed advances near Donetsk City.
  
• Russia continues efforts to source ballistic missiles and other weapons from North Korea for use in Ukraine.

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2024